The Law and Policy of Online Privacy:
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Dennis D. Hirsch†
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Internet poses profound new challenges for information privacy.1 Companies such as Google save and store our every
search query and can often trace them back to us as individuals.2 Websites track how we use their sites and frequently share this information
with others.3 Internet service providers (ISPs) have begun to examine
the packets of information by which we communicate with the Internet
and to search them for data that will reveal our preferences and behaviors.4 These companies do not engage in these activities because they
dislike privacy. They do it because personal information, which can be
used for marketing and many other purposes, has economic value. As a
result, the Internet has become Janus-faced.5 On one hand, it appears to
offer great freedom and anonymity. On the other, it ferrets out and stores
everything from our most banal behaviors to our deepest secrets.6 This
not only damages individual privacy; it also erodes people’s trust in the
online environment and threatens to undermine the continued growth of
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Daniel Fiorino, Ira Rubinstein, and Professors Susan Rose-Ackerman, Douwe Korff, Margriet Overkleeft-Verburg, Bernt Hugenholtz, Joris van Hoboken, Nico van Eijk, and Natali Helburger for offering insightful suggestions about, and support for, this project; Daniel Lenert for providing superb
and diligent research assistance; and Capital University Law School for supporting this project with
a summer research grant. The author alone is responsible for any errors or omissions.
1. See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1198–99 (2001) (providing a clear and informative overview of this phenomenon).
2. See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text (describing this practice).
3. See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text (describing this practice).
4. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (describing this practice).
5. Janus was a Roman god. The Romans typically depicted him with two faces looking in
opposite directions. The term “Janus-faced” has accordingly come to mean two-faced. See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 669 (11th ed. 2007) (defining “Janus” and “Janusfaced”).
6. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1619–20 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Cyberspace].
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the Internet economy.7 If the United States is to continue to be a society
in which personal privacy and the Internet economy flourish together,
then it is vital that we find an effective way to protect personal information on the Internet. 8
Two main camps currently dominate the discussion as to how to
protect personal privacy on the Internet. The first calls for government
regulation.9 It seeks legislation that would set strict limits on how companies collect data online, what types of personal information they can
collect, and how they can use it.10 Proponents of this approach maintain
that strong government regulation is necessary to protect unsuspecting
Internet users from the self-interested behavior of Internet-based companies.11 The second camp, which has thus far won the day, resists government intrusion in the fragile and fast-moving Internet economy and
argues that market and industry self-regulation will yield better results
than government rules.12 It maintains that Internet businesses already
have a market incentive to protect user privacy to avoid losing customers.13 Government regulation is unnecessary and could prove counterproductive.14
This Article has two main purposes. First, it shows that critics of
both the government regulation and the market/self-regulation approach7. Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn
from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2006) (discussing a “tragedy of the commons”
scenario that could cause many Internet users to lose trust in the medium and pull back from the
online environment); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1160 (2000) (“[I]nformation privacy is a key to building trust among consumers and trust is essential
for the promise of e-commerce to be realized.”).
8. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 2 (2d ed. 2006).
9. Jared Strauss & Kenneth S. Rogerson, Policies for Online Privacy in the United States and
the European Union, 19 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 173, 188 (2002) (“Many privacy advocates
and legislators have argued that the US Congress should pass legislation requiring businesses to
follow fair information practices as has been done in the member states of the European Union.”).
10. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31408, INTERNET PRIVACY:
OVERVIEW AND LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION 4, 19 (2006) [hereinafter CRS
2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT] (describing those who advocate for federal legislation and profiling pending online privacy bills).
11. See id. at 4 (discussing how advocates believe that legislation is needed to prevent “bad
actors” from putting their own interests ahead of their social obligations).
12. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L. J. 1045,
1045 (2001) (arguing that when it comes to regulation of the Internet, “policymakers’ first instinct
should be to rely on markets and technology to address troublesome issues”).
13. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 179 (discussing those who hold this view); Orson G.
Swindle, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address to the Reston Chamber of Commerce: Regulation
of Privacy on the Internet: Where Do You Want to Go Today? (April 8, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/reston.shtm.
14. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (discussing those who believe that the online
industries, not government regulators, should develop the rules).
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es have raised important concerns about these proposed solutions. There
are important reasons to question whether either of these approaches can
effectively address the Internet privacy problem. Second, it argues that
policy makers and scholars should explore an alternative approach
known as “co-regulation.” Co-regulation encompasses initiatives in
which government and industry share responsibility for drafting and enforcing regulatory standards.15 It is neither pure government regulation,
nor pure industry self-regulation, but rather a hybrid of the two. Coregulation is not a new phenomenon and can be found at various places
in the regulatory landscape.16 The question is: Can co-regulation provide
a useful alternative strategy for protecting online privacy?
There are reasons to believe that it might. Proponents of coregulation claim that it provides the flexibility of self-regulation17 while
adding the supervision and rigor of government rules.18 They see coregulation as the best of both worlds—an enforceable, rigorous approach
that can protect individual privacy while also keeping up with, and meeting the needs of, the growing Internet economy.19 But co-regulation, too,
has its critics. These commentators assert that co-regulation lacks transparency and accountability as compared to traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking.20 They warn that the backroom discussions in
which government and industry negotiate regulatory compliance and
“share” rulemaking and enforcement responsibilities will often result in

15. HANS-BREDOW-INSTITUT, FINAL REPORT: STUDY ON CO-REGULATION MEASURES IN THE
MEDIA SECTOR 17 (2006) [hereinafter BREDOW-INSTITUT REPORT] (defining “co-regulation” as
systems that “combin[e] state- and non-state regulation” and contrasting it with self-regulation,
which operates “without any state involvement”). American legal and policy scholars often use the
term interchangeably with “collaborative governance.”
16. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXTGENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104–05 (discussing these potential virtues of negotiated agreements); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (same). See generally JOSEPH REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A
STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (1988).
18. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 107–09; Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, Sjaak
Nouwt, Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens, Should Self-Regulation be the Starting Point?, in
STARTING POINT FOR ITC REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 109,
149 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Corien Prins, Maurice Schellekens & Miriam Lips eds., 2006) (discussing
how governments can play an important role in “raising awareness and in enhancing enforcement, so
that self-regulatory rules are indeed followed in practice”).
19. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 190 (calling for a blend of legal and self-regulatory
mechanisms that could “harness[] the adaptability of self-regulation and the government’s enforcement capability”). Cf. Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 112 (“Co-regulation should combine binding
legislative and regulatory action with actions taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their
practical expertise.”).
20. Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 124 (discussing those who have concerns about selfregulation’s lack of procedures for involving the public and the ensuing “lack of transparency”).
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deals that favor industry and sell short the public interest.21 Some fear
that industry will take advantage of co-regulatory processes to “capture”
the agency and co-opt it to industry’s point of view.22 It is too early to
tell whether the proponents or the critics have it right. Before making
such an assessment, we need to study co-regulation and evaluate how it
might function as a means of protecting personal information.23
An excellent opportunity to do this analysis recently arose. The European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive allows E.U. member nations to experiment with a co-regulatory approach to the protection of
personal data.24 During the past decade, many of these nations have implemented such a program.25 This experience can tell us a great deal
about how collaborative governance might work in the realm of Internet
privacy.
Under the European co-regulatory approach, each member nation
passes a comprehensive data protection statute.26 The nation then invites
representatives from a given regulated sector to draft a “code of conduct”
for the industry that embodies the statutory requirements.27 If the regulatory authority agrees that the code of conduct meets the terms of the statute and approves it, then compliance with the code constitutes compliance with the statute.28 From that point on, firms can follow a set of
rules that their own peers have drafted (subject to government review
and approval) and, in so doing, comply with the law. The European
model is not self-regulation since the government retains an important
role in reviewing, approving, and enforcing the proposed codes of conduct. But neither is it pure government regulation since the industry associations, not the regulators, draft the detailed rules and standards that
will govern their members. Instead, it is a form of “co-regulation”29 in
21. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 105–06 (citing these concerns).
22. Id. at 105 (citing these concerns).
23. One scholar who has begun to engage in this analysis is Ira Rubinstein. See generally
Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes (N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-16, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1510275.
24. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, art. 27(1) (providing that member states should encourage
economic sectors to draw up codes of conduct and thus participate in a co-regulatory approach to
data protection).
25. See infra notes 245–72 and accompanying text (describing the various national laws that
implement the code of conduct approach).
26. 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, art. 32(1) (requiring member nations to pass such a statute).
27. Id. art 27(1).
28. Id. art. 27(2). The relevant industry is also responsible for enforcing the codes of conduct.
See infra notes 226–44 and accompanying text (describing this process).
29. See generally BREDOW-INSTITUT REPORT, supra note 15.
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that government and industry share responsibility for drafting and enforcing regulatory standards.30
How have the European member states gone about implementing
this approach? What do the statutes that embody it look like? Have the
national programs been a success? Does the European experiment provide support for the proponents of co-regulation? Or does it validate the
concerns of the critics? These important questions have received surprisingly little attention in U.S. scholarly literature, and almost none in U.S.
law reviews. This Article begins to explore the topic. Focusing on the
legal dimension of the E.U. initiative, it examines the provisions of the
European Union’s 1995 Data Protection Directive that allow member
nations to engage in co-regulation.31 It then provides the first comprehensive analysis in a U.S. law review of the national laws that have implemented this co-regulatory approach.32 It compares these laws to one
another, develops an original way of categorizing and understanding
them, and draws lessons about the design of legislation to support coregulation of online privacy.
The Article is structured as follows: Part II shows that the Internet
generates serious new threats to individual privacy. Part III describes in
more detail the arguments that critics have leveled against the government regulation and the market/self-regulation approaches and evaluates
what experience has to tell us about these models. Part III also provides
an introduction to co-regulation and surveys the theoretical literature regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this collaborative approach.
Part IV turns to the European experiment with data protection codes of
conduct. It analyzes the E.U. and national laws that authorize this initiative. The Article closes in Part V with suggestions for further research
about this important area of privacy law and policy.
II. ONLINE THREATS TO INFORMATION PRIVACY
One of the most profound changes in American society in recent
decades has been the emergence and exponential growth of the Internet
and e-commerce.33 This change has produced many benefits. But it has
also led to an unprecedented increase in the collection, aggregation, and
use of personal information, creating new and profound challenges to
30. See id. at 17 (defining “co-regulation” as systems that “combin[e] state- and non-state
regulation” and contrasting it with self-regulation, which operates “without any state involvement”).
31. See infra notes 226–44 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 245–72 and accompanying text.
33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2000) [hereinafter FTC MAY 2000
REPORT]. The Internet has grown at an exponential rate. As of 2000, 90 million Americans used the
Internet, and 60 million shopped online. Id.
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information privacy.34 This Part will describe how Internet businesses
collect our personal information online and how they use this information.
A. How Internet Businesses Collect Personal Information Online
1. Search Engines
Most users of the Internet begin by accessing a search engine35 and
entering a search query. The collection of the user’s personal information begins here. Search engines collect and store every query that users
make.36 In most cases, they are able to link these queries both to the
computer on which they were entered37 and to the user’s individual identity.38 Search queries are often fairly innocuous, but they can also be
highly personal. In 2006, AOL posted on its website a database of 20
million search queries entered by 657,000 users over a three-month period.39 Among the searches were queries for “60 single men,” “foods to
avoid when breast feeding,” “depression and medical leave,” “fear that
spouse contemplating cheating,” and many thousands of queries related
to sex and sexuality.40 These queries were not atypical. Many users turn
to the Internet for information related to their political beliefs, romantic
aspirations, medical conditions, sexual preferences or fantasies, intellectual interests, anxieties, and life changes, to name but a few such personal areas. Collectively, these queries provide an intimate picture of the
user’s daily pursuits and inner life. They constitute a personal “catalog
of intentions, curiosity, anxieties and quotidian questions.”41

34. See id. at 33 (“While American businesses have always collected some data from consumers in order to facilitate transactions, the Internet allows for the efficient, inexpensive collection of
unprecedented amounts of data that can be used for myriad subsequent purposes. It is the prevalence, ease and relatively low cost of such information collection and use that distinguishes the online environment from more traditional means of commerce and information collection and thereby
raises significant consumer privacy concerns.”).
35. For example, Google, AOL, or Yahoo!.
36. In Search of Online Privacy, INDEPENDENT (United Kingdom), April 9, 2008, at 26, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-in-search-of-onlineprivacy-806284.html.
37. Id.; Kang, supra note 1, at 1224–25 (user reveals IP address to any server it contacts).
38. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, 12 (2000) [hereinafter, FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT].
39. Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09ao
l.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Search engines store these queries and retain them for months, or
even years.42 They are able to link them to the computer that sent them.43
Where the user of that computer has registered for one or more services,44 the search engines are then able to link the queries to the individual
person.45 This gives them the ability, should they choose to use it, to
construct a detailed map of a given user’s queries and, therefore, of her
interests, political views, medical conditions, wishes, and fears.
Wary of privacy concerns, the major search engines claim that they
do not link user queries with user identities. Many claim to carefully
remove all references to the user’s name and identity before they store
that person’s queries. For example AOL, when constructing the database
of queries mentioned above, identified each searcher by an assigned
number, rather than by name.46 But even this practice is an inadequate
shield. Journalists who examined the AOL database and reviewed the
anonymous searches of one user (user No. 4417749) were able to piece
together sufficient information to identify her by name.47 Thus, searchengine collection and storage of user queries poses a threat to privacy
both because the search engines themselves can link an individual to her
queries and because third parties who are able to get their hands on the
data—even data the search engines try to render anonymous—can often
do so as well.
2. Websites
Having entered a query and received search-engine results, the typical user clicks on and enters one or more websites. The great majority
of websites collect information about the users who visit them.48 Some
overtly request or require users to fill out registration, survey, or order
forms that ask for personally identifying information (PII)49 such as the

42. INDEPENDENT, supra note 36.
43. Id.; Kang, supra note 1, at 1224–25 (user reveals IP address to any server it contacts).
44. For example, free e-mail (e.g., G-mail) or free online storage space.
45. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 4.
46. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 39.
47. Id. The individual user, Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old resident of Lilburn, Georgia,
searched for “60 single men,” “landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,” information on several people with the
last name “Arnold,” and “homes sold in shadow lake sub-division gwinnett county georgia.” Based
on these and other searches, the journalists were able to identify her. Id.
48. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1998) [hereinafter, FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT] (“[FTC research] shows that the vast majority of Web sites—upward
of 85%—collect personal information from consumers.”). Accord Schwartz, Cyberspace, supra
note 6, at 1629–31 (describing how and why websites collect personal information).
49. Such information need not contain the user’s name in order to qualify as personally identifiable. According to one study, it would be possible to identify 87% of the U.S. population based
only on a 5-digit zip code, gender, and date of birth. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT:
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user’s name, postal address, e-mail address, driver’s license number, or
social security number. Other sites collect personal data more subtly
through the use of “cookies”50 and other technologies51 that unobtrusively track user activities and associate them with a particular computer or
device.52 Through such technologies, website administrators are able to
track and record which page a given user visits, how long the user spends
there, and how the user engages with that page (e.g. what the user “clicks
on”).
While this “clickstream” data is anonymous in theory, it is often not
so in practice. Many sites collect personally identifying information that
they can link to a specific computer or device and also to cookie data
associated with that computer.53 Indeed, in 2000, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) completed a survey and found that “most” of the
sites surveyed were able to do this.54 Moreover, user profiles have become so comprehensive 55 that it is often possible to infer a user’s identity without PII.56
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 24 & n.53 (2009) [hereinafter FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT] (citations omitted).
50. A cookie is a small text file that the website places on the user’s hard drive when the user
visits the site. Id. at 2, n.3. The cookie records data about the user’s activity on the site⎯the pages
the user has visited, the content she has viewed, how long she spent at the site, search queries that
she entered while at the site, passwords she created, what she put in her “shopping cart,” etc. Id.
The next time the user visits the website, the cookie communicates this data to the site. This allows
the site to recognize the individual consumer and tailor the Web experience to her (e.g., to remember
what was in her “shopping cart”). Id. at 2. Over time, the site owner is able to build up a picture of
the particular user and how she has utilized the site. See id. at 22; FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra
note 38, at 4. Though the user can disable cookies, few consumers seem to know about or take
advantage of this opportunity and, even when they do, they may inadvertently undo this choice. See
PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND AT SELF-REGULATION 14–17 (2007) (describing these problems with
consumer
opt-out);
Privacy
Policy,
GOOGLE.COM
(Oct.
3,
2010),
http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/privacypolicy.html.
51. See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49 at 2 & n.3 (citing “web bugs,” “web beacons,”
and “flash cookies”).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 2 & n.4.
54. “Most of the sites surveyed, therefore, are capable of creating personal profiles of online
consumers by tying any demographic, interest, purchasing behavior, or surfing behavior information
they collect to personally identifying information.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (2000)
[hereinafter, FTC MAY 2000 REPORT]. See also FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at 25.
55. See infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (describing how network advertisers combine
cookie data from many different websites into a single, highly detailed user profile).
56. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 22–23 (“[W]hen combined, such information
would constitute a highly detailed and sensitive profile that is potentially traceable to the consumer.
The storage of such data also creates the risk that it could fall into the wrong hands or be used later
in combination with even richer, more sensitive, data.”); FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at
12 (According to commentators at an FTC workshop, “the comprehensive nature of the profiles and
the technology used to create them make it reasonably easy to associate previously anonymous pro-
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3. The Future: Internet Service Providers
If current trends are any indication, we may find our personal information collected without us even having to enter a query or visit a
website. ISPs⎯Microsoft, AOL, and others⎯are beginning to experiment with “deep packet inspection.”57 This practice allows the ISP to
automatically inspect the contents of data “packets” as they travel on the
Internet in order to mine personal information from them.58 These packets could contain relatively innocuous data like queries or websites; however, they could also easily contain e-mails or documents.59 If widely
adopted, deep packet inspection promises a whole new dimension to the
problem of online privacy that will render it even more intense.
B. Who Uses Personal Information Collected Online?
Having introduced those who collect the most information online,
we now turn to those who use this data. These include websites, network
advertisers, data brokers, secondary users, and the government.
1. Websites
Websites use cookie data to improve users’ experiences at the site.
For example, a website will remember a username and password entered
during a prior visit to the site, reconstitute the contents of a shopping cart
on a return visit,60 or provide personalized news and weather or stock
quotes.61 Many sites also use the information from past visits to predict
which services or products are most likely to appeal to the user and to
present the user with advertisements promoting those items.62
2. Network Advertisers
The principal users of online personal data, however, are “network
advertisers.”63 Network advertisers are responsible for the banner advertisements that users see when they visit a website. Network advertisers
enter into contractual relationships with many different websites: in exfiles with particular individuals. This means that anyone who obtains access to ostensibly anonymous data⎯either by purchasing the data or hacking into it⎯might be able to mine the data and link it
to identifiable individuals.”).
57. See generally Samir Jain, The Promise and Perils of Deep Packet Inspection, 8 PRIVACY &
SECURITY L. REP. 217.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 8–9.
61. Id. at 9.
62. This is known as “first party” advertising since the same website is both collecting the data
and conveying the ad. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at iii, 26.
63. See generally FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 2–3.
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change for payment, the websites provide the network advertiser with
user clickstream data and allow the advertiser to display advertisements
on their site.64 These arrangements allow a single network advertiser to
collect user information from hundreds or thousands of different websites, and to see what a given user has done at each of these sites.65
The network advertiser combines this information with other information that it has purchased about the user. This includes searchquery data, data that the user has provided through surveys and registration forms, and data collected by third-party sources regarding the user’s
off-line purchases and activities.66 The result is a highly comprehensive
and fine-grained “behavioral profile” of the user that can include hundreds of data fields⎯everything from the user’s brand of toothpaste to
medical conditions, preferred travel destinations, political commitments,
intellectual interests, and sexual preferences or fantasies.67 Moreover, it
is often possible for the network advertiser to tie the profile to an identified user, either because the user at one point provided a name or other
PII when filling out a survey or registration form or making a credit card
purchase, or because the profile is sufficiently detailed to allow the advertiser (or another who has obtained the data) to infer the user’s identity
without PII.68
Network advertisers employ behavioral profiles to make inferences
about the user’s “tastes, needs and purchasing habits” and then select
specific banner ads to show to that user.69 They deliver these ads in conjunction with the networked websites. When a user visits such a site, the
site automatically contacts the network advertiser and requests advertising content.70 The advertiser searches its database of information on the
specific user, chooses an ad or ads to present to him, and provides this to
the site.71 When the webpage arrives at the user’s computer screen, it
contains not only the requested content, but also the targeted ads. This
happens so fast that the user does not notice it but accepts the ads as part
of the requested webpage.72 In 2000, the FTC estimated that network
64. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34693, PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE
ADVERTISING: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DATA GATHERING BY ONLINE ADVERTISERS SUCH AS DOUBLE
CLICK AND NEBUAD 1–2 (2008).
65. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 3 & n.5.
66. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
67. See id. at 5–6.
68. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 54, at 9 & n.53; FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note
49, at 2 & n.4.
69. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
70. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 3.
71. Id.
72. An example may help to illustrate the phenomenon. Assume that a user visits the website
of the Washington Post, a network member, and reads an article about the Washington Nationals
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advertisers had served tens of billions of banner ads to users.73 That
number has increased substantially over the past decade.74
This practice has its benefits. It makes it more likely that people
will receive ads about goods and services they may actually be interested
in,75 saving them from having to wade through ads that hold no interest
for them. It also makes businesses’ advertising efforts far more efficient.76 On the other hand, network advertisers have the ability to create
“behavioral profiles” that chronicle our desires, anxieties, and beliefs and
that are traceable directly to us.77 This creates “a portrait that is quite
comprehensive and, to many, inherently intrusive.”78 In this respect,
network advertising significantly damages the privacy of Internet users.79
3. Data Brokers
Websites and network advertisers sometimes sell personal information that they have collected to data brokers.80 Data brokers specialize in
pulling together and analyzing personal information gleaned from many
baseball team. The Post’s server places a third-party cookie on the user’s browser that conveys the
user’s activity to the network advertiser. Next, the same user visits a travel website, also a network
member, to search for flights from Washington, D.C. to New York. The travel company’s server
also places a third-party cookie and so conveys the user’s activity to the advertiser. Finally, the user
visits the website of the local television news station⎯also a network member⎯in order to check
the next day’s weather. The station’s Web server sends a request to the network advertiser for a
banner advertisement. Putting together the user’s possible travel to New York City with his interest
in baseball, the advertiser serves up a banner ad for tickets to New York Yankees baseball games at
the new Yankee Stadium. This arrives as a seamless part of the news station’s webpage displayed
along with information about the next day’s weather. See id. (minor changes made to the FTC’s
example).
73. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 2–3.
74. Indeed, between 2002 and 2006 online advertising revenue nearly tripled, growing from $6
billion to $16.6 billion. FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 8; Ryan Blitstein, Microsoft,
Google, Yahoo in Online Ad War, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 19, 2007.
75. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 9; FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at i.
76. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 9.
77. The future looks even bleaker. As mentioned above, the most recent trend does not even
depend on website cookies. Instead, ISPs like Microsoft and AOL are beginning to collect clickstream data by analyzing the packets of information that a given user sends and receives on the Internet. See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 16 & n.40. This process, known as “deep
packet inspection,” encompasses all of a given user’s Web activity, not just that which is conducted
on the advertiser’s network of sites. Id.; Samir Jain, supra note 57, at 217–20. It promises to yield
behavioral profiles that are even more comprehensive and invasive. See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT,
supra note 49, at 16 & n.40; Samir Jain, supra note 57, at 217–20.
78. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 12.
79. In addition, it can be argued that the very targeted marketing for which the data is collected
is itself harmful to individual privacy. By using our past behavior as a basis for selecting the ads we
will see, online behavioral marketing tends to keep us on the same path that we are on. It presents us
with fewer choices and influences and so may produce more “path dependence” in our growth and
development.
80. See FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 16 (citations omitted).
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different sources, including public records, the media, credit-reporting
agencies, and other sources.81 Increasingly, data brokers have been combining this off-line data, traceable to specific individuals, with online
data that they can match to those same individuals.82 This aggregation of
data makes the individual profiles⎯the picture that emerges when all of
this data about a given person is put together⎯even more comprehensive
and detailed. Moreover, the existence of detailed computer profiles
creates the possibility that someone will hack into them, thereby increasing the threat of identity theft and fraud.83
4. Secondary Users
Websites and network advertisers use the information they collect
in order to better serve and better market to Internet users. But do they
also sell it to others, and if so, what do these other parties do with it? Do
they use it to decide who they will hire, or provide with insurance or a
loan? Little is known about these “secondary uses” of the personal information that Web-based companies collect on the Internet. Recently,
the FTC surveyed websites regarding their collection and use of personal
information. The survey asked about these “secondary” uses by entities
other than the one that collects it.84 The websites were quite forthcoming
about their own collection and use of the data; however, they provided
almost no information about secondary uses.85 This silence is deafening.
As the FTC itself has said, it is hard to believe that no one is making secondary use of this information.86
Preliminary information suggests that secondary uses are a cause
for concern. Some businesses may be using the information to engage in
“Weblining”⎯the practice of charging higher prices to some consumers
based on their online profiles.87 For example, life insurance companies
may be using the information to decide how to price policies for specific
individuals, or even whether to offer them a policy at all.88 This practice
is extremely invasive, especially where the information in question involves medical conditions. Similarly, lenders may be using personal in81. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
283, 301 (2003); see also Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002).
82. See FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 16 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Instead, the websites must be unwilling to disclose such uses because they fear that they
would alarm the regulators and the public. Proponents of protecting privacy and personal information should be keen to learn more about this practice.
87. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 13 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
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formation to decide whether to offer loans to specific individuals and
how to price them.89 Given the history of racially discriminatory “redlining” in this country, the prospect of Weblining in the real-estate market
should be a cause for concern.
Employers may also be using the information to help them decide
who to interview and hire.90 This potential secondary use is particularly
vexing. People may reveal information online regarding their shopping
and spending habits, political interests, sexual orientation, marital status,
or medical conditions. Employers may find this information to be very
valuable when choosing future employees; however, few employers
would ask for such personal information directly and most of us, if
asked, would find such questions highly invasive for any job not requiring a high security clearance. Online data collection can allow employers to access this information without the applicant’s knowledge. This
access creates a serious invasion of personal privacy.
5. The Government
The most significant privacy issue, however, is the possibility of
online companies sharing user information with the government. In
some instances, government officials have requested that ISPs provide—
or have even issued subpoenas for—the identity behind an e-mail or Internet Protocol address.91 In other cases, government officials have subpoenaed information about users’ Internet queries and Web travels.92
Suspected criminals, or even citizens whose only sin is to oppose the
views of those in power, could find their daily activities monitored to an
extent beyond what even a wiretap on their phone would reveal—and all
without the issuance of a warrant. This is an unwelcome prospect in a
democracy.
III. GOVERNMENT REGULATION, MARKET REGULATION,
AND SELF-REGULATION
The practices described above have convinced many that the online
environment poses a meaningful threat to individual privacy. But there

89. Id. at 13 & n.45.
90. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 487
(1995) (health information used inappropriately for employment decisions).
91. See Peter Shinkle, 65.227.106.78: This Internet Footprint Led to Suspected Killer, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 16, 2002, at A1 (providing example of this).
92. See Arshad Mohammed, Google Argues Against Subpoena: Turning Over Data Would
Hurt Firm, Not Help U.S., Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2006, at D03 (discussing government
subpoenas against various ISPs seeking search query data).
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is far less consensus on how to deal with this problem. In the United
States there are two main camps: those who favor detailed government
regulation and those who prefer market and industry self-regulation.93
Co-regulation offers a third alternative. In order to understand the role
that co-regulation might play, it is important first to examine the two
dominant views that frame the current debate.
A. Government Regulation
Proponents of government regulation argue that the desire for profits, coupled with the economic value of personal information, will inevitably lead private firms to collect a great deal of personal information online.94 They assert that the legislature should take steps to protect Internet privacy as an important societal value; for instance, they call for legislation that would set specific limits on the online collection of personal
information and on the distribution and use of that information.95 Following the typical American regulatory model, this law would take shape
through two stages. First, Congress would pass a sweeping and rigorous
statute. Then, a regulatory agency such as the FTC would develop detailed regulations implementing this legal framework.
Federal legislators have introduced several such bills in the House
and Senate, but neither chamber has come close to passing any of them.96
Some of the bills provided for broad regulation of the Internet sector.97
Others focused more narrowly on websites and network advertising.98
On May 4, 2010, Representatives Boucher (D-Va.) and Stearns (R-Fla.)
released a “Staff Discussion Draft” of a bill of the latter type.99 The bill
93. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. Cf. CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT,
supra note 10, at i (“The debate over website information policies concerns whether industry self
regulation or legislation is the best approach to protecting consumer privacy.”).
94. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (2003).
95. CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 9.
96. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31408, INTERNET PRIVACY:
OVERVIEW AND PENDING LEGISLATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY
REPORT] (“[M]any Internet privacy bills were considered, but did not clear, the 107th Congress”);
CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 5, 18 (describing Internet privacy bills in
the 109th Congress and concluding that while some such bills were introduced in the House and
Senate, none have passed).
97. See, e.g. Online Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 84, 109th Cong. (2006) (covers all
collection of personal information not already covered by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act).
98. Act of May 3, 2010 (Discussion Draft 2010), available at http://www.boucher.house.gov/i
mages/stories/Privacy_Draft_5-10.pdf.
99. Press Release, Office of Rep. Boucher, Boucher, Stearns Release Discussion Draft of Privacy Legislation: Measure Confers Privacy Rights on Internet Users (May 4, 2010), available
at http://www.boucher.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1957:boucher-
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would require websites and network advertisers, among others, to provide users with “clear and conspicuous” notice of how they collect, use,
store, and share users’ personal information.100 It would mandate that
they provide users with meaningful choices about whether to allow these
practices.101 Moreover, it would require affirmative consent before collecting or using “sensitive information” (e.g., information relating to
medical conditions, finances, race, sexual orientation, or precise location)102 or sharing any personal information with unaffiliated third parties.103 Finally, the bill would require websites and network advertisers
to take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure the accuracy and security of personal data that they collect and use.104
Like traditional government regulation, the bill would delegate to
an agency (here the FTC) the authority to “issue such regulations as it
determines to be necessary”105 to carry out the bill’s provisions and the
power to issue penalties for violations.106 It would further give state attorneys general the authority to bring civil enforcement actions on behalf
of the citizens of their states.107 Were Congress to enact it and the FTC
to issue implementing regulations, the bill would likely constitute precisely the kind of detailed government regulation that proponents of this
approach advocate.
Within days of the bill’s introduction, industry and pro-market
groups expressed opposition to the Boucher–Stearns bill. Some maintained that the bill would impose excessive costs on Internet-based businesses that are still trying to recover from the 2008 recession.108 Others
went further, complaining that “by mandating a hodge-podge of restrictive regulatory defaults, policymakers could unintentionally devastate the
‘free’ Internet as we know it, . . . raise prices, [and] quash digital innovation.”109 Still others claimed that the bill reflected a mistaken belief that
“Congress and regulators . . . thought they knew how to deliver privacy
stearns-release-discussion-draft-of-privacy-legislation-may-4-2010&catid=33:2010-pressreleases&Itemid=41.
100. Act of May 3, 2010 § 3(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
101. Id. § 3(a)(1)(B), (a)(3).
102. Id. §§ 2(10) (defining “sensitive information”), 3(c) (requiring opt-in consent).
103. Id. § 3(b)(1).
104. Id. § 4(a), (b).
105. Id. § 8(a)(3).
106. Id. § 8(a)(1),(2).
107. Id. § 5(b).
108. Mathew Ingram, Congress Proposes Sweeping Internet Privacy Bill, GIGAOM (May 4,
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/05/04/congress-proposes-sweeping-internet-privacy-bill.
109. News Release, The Progress and Freedom Foundation, PFF Statement on House Privacy
Bill Discussion Draft: Szoka & Thierer Fear “Privacy Industrial Policy” Will Devastate Digital
Economy (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.pff.org/news/news/2010/2010-05-04Privacy_Bill.html.
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better than markets. We know they don’t, but they still think they do.”110
The Boucher–Stearns bill, like the legislative proposals that preceded it,
will face an uphill battle in becoming law.111
The reactions to the Boucher–Stearns bill reflect many of the
themes that opponents of government regulation have voiced for years.
Critics emphasize the importance of the Internet to the future of the U.S.
economy and express concern that legislation would impose burdensome
costs on this sector.112 They assert that government officials, who know
little about the industries they regulate, will impose impractical requirements that will seriously undermine business competitiveness.113 Critics
also highlight the fast-changing nature of Internet technologies and business models, arguing that the government regulators who implement the
legislation will not be able to keep pace with these changes114 and that
the rules they create will quickly become out of date and ill-suited to
their intended purpose.115 Judging by the legislature’s failure to pass into
law any of the various Internet privacy bills it has considered in recent
years, these arguments have had a strong impact.116

110. Declan McCullagh, House Privacy Bill Draws Fire from All Sides, CNET NEWS, May 5,
2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20004165-38.html (quoting Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at the Cato Institute).
111. Ingram, supra note 108 (“[Rep. Boucher has] been meeting with both industry groups
such as the Interactive Advertising Bureau and privacy advocates trying to come up with a solution
that satisfies both sides. But it doesn’t appear that such a goal is even possible.”). Even Rep. Stearns
said publicly that he did not agree with everything in the bill—an unusual statement for the sponsor
of a bill to make. McCullagh, supra note 110.
112. See Koops, et al., supra note 18, at 109 (The source discusses those who “complain . . . about the lack of flexibility in legislation and are skeptical about the feasibility of efficient
and adequate ICT regulation by means of legislation.”). See generally Keith Perine, The Persuader, INDUSTRY STANDARD, (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi_m0HWW/is_47_3/ai_66932989/?tag=content;col1 (discussing this criticism).
113. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 188 (“[C]ritics maintain that government action
creates burdensome, inflexible regulation and that self-regulation remains the best solution to privacy problems . . . .”).
114. See id. at 181 (discussing those who believe that the “fast-changing” nature of the Internet
makes it ill-suited to government regulation).
115. For example, a statute requiring firms to post large and eye-catching notices about their
data collection practices, designed for delivery to computer screens, will not fit on the mobile phone
screens through which more and more people now access the Internet. Such rules will seriously
constrain innovation or become obsolete as technologies and business practices change.
116. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 18 (describing Internet
privacy bills introduced in the 109th Congress and concluding that while some such bills were introduced in the House and Senate, none have passed); CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra
note 96, at 4 (concluding that “many Internet privacy bills were considered by, but did not clear, the
107th Congress”).
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B. The Market and Self-Regulation
Critics of government regulation often argue that the market, either
alone or in combination with industry self-regulation, will do a better job
of protecting personal information.
1. Leave it to the Market
Those who favor a market solution argue that individual Internet
businesses will enhance their competitive positions by responding to customer preferences for greater privacy, thereby leading to a more privacyfriendly Web.117 According to this logic, if customers are not currently
requiring websites and other Web-based firms to protect user privacy it
means they value the services they are receiving more than the privacy
they are losing. Proponents of the market solution contend that the market, left to its own devices, will arrive at the optimal level of privacy protection, whereas government regulation will distort this outcome.118
Those who object to a market solution focus on information asymmetries.119 Web users are often unaware of the collection of their personal information online, as much of it occurs instantaneously and invisibly.120 Even where they are aware of the collection of personal data,
users often do not understand how network advertisers and data brokers
will combine this information with other data about them; how employers, lenders, and others will use these profiles; and how data mining operations can infer additional, latent information from such data. This
information gap prevents users from expressing their true preferences for
privacy protection and so can prevent the market from responding appropriately. Because the market for online privacy is characterized by highly imperfect and asymmetrical information, firms can collect and use far
more personal data than they could in a hypothetical perfect market.
Other critics focus on actual market experience. They reason that,
if the laissez-faire theory were correct, the market would provide meaningful privacy protections; because the empirical data unfortunately
suggests otherwise, a market system must be ineffective. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), first developed by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973,121 are an internationally ac117. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing those who hold this view); Swindle,
supra note 13.
118. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 19; Swindle, supra note 13.
119. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 179 (discussing this criticism).
120. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 11; Schwartz, Cyberspace, supra note 6, at
1621–22.
121. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED
PERS. DATA SYS., RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–42 (1973).
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cepted standard for what constitutes adequate privacy protection.122
They require those who collect and use personal information to provide
the following:
(1) Notice—data collectors must disclose their information practices
before collecting personal information from consumers;
(2) Choice—consumers must be given options with respect to
whether and how personal information collected from them may be
used for purposes beyond those for which the information was provided; (3) Access—consumers should be able to view and contest
the accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and
(4) Security—data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure
that information collected from consumers is accurate and secure
from unauthorized use.123

Not surprisingly, these criteria correspond to some of the essential preconditions that must be met before users can make informed market
choices.124
In 2000, the FTC surveyed the busiest U.S. commercial websites in
order “to assess industry’s progress in protecting consumer privacy online.”125 The results showed the percentage of websites that collected
personally identifying information and the percentage that provided privacy disclosures to their users.126 For those sites that provided a disclosure (often in the form of a privacy policy), the FTC assessed how the
site’s privacy policy compared with the FIPPs. The FTC found that,
while the great majority of the busiest websites collected personal information,127 nearly forty percent posted no privacy policy.128 Of those that
did post a policy, the majority did not meet the minimum standards set

122. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001) (explaining how the Fair Information Practices
influenced the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s privacy guidelines).
123. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 4.
124. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (“[E]nforcing fair information practices is the
best way to harness market forces, because these practices ensure that consumers have the full information needed to make informed choices.”).
125. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 7.
126. Id. at 9–11.
127. The Commission found that 97% of the sites collect an e-mail address or some other type
of personal identifying information. Id. at 9. A widely cited Georgetown University study confirms
these results, finding that, in 1999, only 10% of sites provided disclosures that touch on all four fair
information practice principles. See generally MARY CULNAN, GEORGETOWN INTERNET PRIVACY
POLICY SURVEY: REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1999). Moreover, there is a 99%
chance that a user surfing the busiest websites will, over the course of a one-month period, visit a
site that collects personally identifying information. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 9.
128. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 10.
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out in the FIPPs.129 Probing further, the FTC evaluated the content of the
privacy policies and found that many used contradictory language,130
buried exceptions deep in the fine print,131 provided ambiguous or misleading statements about how the site handled user “choice,”132 and reserved the right to change policies without notice.133 No one has updated
the FTC’s 2000 report. More recent assessments suggest, however, that
while more websites now post privacy policies, these documents remain
inaccessible and hard to understand.134 Given the high profits associated
with the collection, use, and sale of personal information, in addition to
the transaction costs and information asymmetries that distort the market,
these findings are not surprising.135
2. Self-Regulation
Some who favor the market approach recognize that market imperfections are possible and accept that some type of collective regulation
may be necessary. They assert, however, that industry self-regulation,
rather than direct government regulation, is the best way to achieve
this.136 Self-regulation, for the purposes of this discussion, is a regulato-

129. Only one in five implemented all four information practices to some degree. Id. at 35.
Only 41% met the notice and choice standards. Id.
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id. at 25. It is difficult for users to read through these lengthy documents, especially if
they are visiting multiple websites in rapid succession, and few take the time to do so. See CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECH., RESPONSE TO THE 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES: THE NETWORK ADVERTISING
INITIATIVE’S SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 4
(2008). See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008).
132. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 26.
133. Id.
134. ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, JANICE TSAI, SERGE EGELMAN & LORRIE CRANOR, THE EFFECT
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INFORMATION ON PURCHASING BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 1
(2007) (noting that recent literature concludes that many privacy policies are inaccessible and hard to
understand).
135. Could it be that Web users really do not value protection of their personal information,
and that is why the websites are not providing it? Studies of user preferences suggest not. In a
Business Week survey, 89% of users expressed discomfort with the idea that their personal identity
could be linked to their Web-browsing and shopping patterns. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note
38, at 14–15 (internal citations omitted). 63% expressed discomfort even if their profiles were not
linked to their name or identity. Id. at 15. See also FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 24 &
n.52. According to other reputable surveys, 92% of respondents were uncomfortable with the idea
that websites would share their information with others, and 93% expressed discomfort with the
notion that websites would sell this information. FTC JUNE 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 16.
136. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 3–4 (describing advocates
of self-regulation); Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181 (“[T]he federal government, industry
members, and private associations have touted self-regulation as the answer to privacy concerns.”).
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ry system in which business representatives define and enforce standards
for their sector with little or no government involvement.137
Proponents of self-regulation argue that this method will institute
protective standards while avoiding the pitfalls of government legislation.138 They point out that industry members know their operations and
business plans better than anyone else and therefore are uniquely positioned to identify the most effective and efficient means of protecting
public values such as privacy.139 Self-regulation will reduce the costs
and burdens associated with online privacy regulation while focusing
regulation on those areas where it will count the most. In a similar vein,
proponents contend that industry members are better able to predict future technologies and business developments and design standards that
can accommodate changes.140 Thus, self-regulation will remain more
relevant and workable than government-imposed standards. Finally,
proponents contend that industry members will be more likely to accept
rules designed and imposed by their peers. Industry will comply more
readily with such rules and will spend less time and energy resisting
them.
This rosy picture may be overly optimistic.141 Critics of selfregulation have advanced several arguments against this approach. First,
they argue that firms will put their own profits ahead of the public interest. As a result, self-regulatory standards will inevitably prove too lenient.142 Second, critics question whether industry representatives, who
do not hold governmental power to fine or otherwise penalize scofflaws,
will possess sufficient power or incentive to enforce industry standards
against their peers.143 Third, critics assert that self-regulatory processes
are lacking in transparency compared to traditional rulemaking, meaning
the public interest will not be adequately represented.144 Finally, these
critics worry that without sanctions for those who do not participate,

137. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 97 (discussing “unilateral commitments” in which “both the targets and determinations of how they are to be met and monitored [are]
at the discretion of the enterprises or associations themselves”); REES, supra note 17, at 9 (describing
how in self-regulation “rulemaking and enforcement are both carried out privately”); Koops, et al.,
supra note 18, at 109 (“[S]elf-regulation implies that private actors themselves implement the applicable norms and rules and, ideally, monitor compliance and enforce the rules in the case of noncompliance.”).
138. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 181.
139. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18.
140. Id.
141. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELFREGULATION: A DECADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT (2005).
142. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 94, at 134.
143. Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 9, at 183. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18.
144. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18.
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many firms will stand by while their competitors institute costly, selfregulatory standards, then free ride on the sector’s improved reputation
for protecting privacy.145 Unsurprisingly, many of these critics call for
government legislation instead of self-regulation.146
Self-regulation of Internet privacy is not just a matter of theory. It
has been in practice since the 1990s. For the better part of the past two
decades, the federal government has embraced self-regulation as the
means to protect Internet privacy.147 In 1997, the Clinton Administration
declared that “[f]or electronic commerce to flourish, the private sector
must lead. Therefore, the Federal Government should encourage industry self-regulation wherever appropriate . . . .”148 The FTC, the agency
with the greatest role in privacy regulation, has also favored selfregulation. For example, in the late 1990s, the Commission stated that
“self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure
fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology”149 and that “the Commission’s goal has
been to encourage and facilitate effective self-regulation . . . .”150 Following a brief period during which the FTC appeared to lose faith in industry efforts and began to call for legislation,151 the Commission returned to its endorsement of self-regulation.152 Industry members responded by launching two initiatives to govern privacy on the Internet,
demonstrating how self-regulation of online privacy has worked in practice. The results were not encouraging.
a. The Online Privacy Alliance
In 1998, the FTC demanded industry self-regulation of online privacy and threatened that, if it was not forthcoming, the government

145. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 107.
146. See CRS 2006 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 10, at 4 (describing those who
“believe self regulation is insufficient” and instead call for legislation).
147. See CRS 2004 INTERNET PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 96, at 1 (“[M]any in Congress and
in the Clinton Administration preferred industry self regulation.”).
148. Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, 2 Pub. Papers 898 (July 1, 1997).
149. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 6 (1999).
150. FTC JUNE 1998 REPORT, supra note 48, at i.
151. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 36.
152. For example, in 2009, it responded to growing controversy over online behavioral marketing by issuing a set of “Self-Regulatory Principles” to guide industry efforts in this area and by
“call[ing] upon [the online behavioral advertising] industry to redouble its efforts in developing selfregulatory programs.” FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 47. This report omitted any
mention of the need for federal legislation.
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would move towards direct regulation.153 The Online Privacy Alliance
(OPA), a group formed in the mid-1990s and consisting of leading Internet firms,154 responded by issuing Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies.155 The Guidelines required all OPA members to implement a privacy policy that would provide users with basic notice about online collection and use of personal data, allow users to “opt-out” of those uses and
to correct inaccurate data, and institute measures to assure data security
and reliability.156
The Guidelines failed. They did not prohibit the collection of sensitive data or protect against harmful uses of data by any means other than
an “opt-out” policy.157 Pointing to the inadequacy of such a provision,
privacy expert Bob Gellman complained, “[I]t can’t be a case that if a
customer doesn’t object, you can do anything.”158 The OPA also failed
to identify a process for enforcing the Guidelines against members that
did not follow them.159 Finally, and most significantly, the OPA proved
unable to recruit and retain a critical mass of key industry players. Only
100 or so companies ultimately joined the group, with significant firms
such as Amazon.com and Lycos choosing not to participate at all.160
With such limited participation, the OPA could hardly claim that it was
creating an Internet environment in which privacy was protected. After a
couple of years, the OPA itself admitted that its self-regulatory approach
had “come up short” and began to support online privacy legislation.161
The OPA has since ceased to exist.
b. The Network Advertising Initiative
The second self-regulatory initiative, the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), followed soon thereafter. The NAI, an organization of

153. Brian McWilliams, Alliance Aims to Beat FTC to the Online-Privacy Punch,
CNN.COM (July 23, 1998), http://articles.cnn.com/1998-07-23/tech/9807_23_
webprivacy.idg_1_privacy-seal-privacy-policies-online-privacy-alliance?_s=PM:TECH.
154. AOL, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and others founded OPA in the mid-1990s to “lead and
support self-regulatory initiatives that create an environment of trust and that foster the protection of
individuals’ privacy online and in electronic commerce.” Frequently Asked Questions, ONLINE
PRIVACY ALLIANCE, http://www.privacyalliance.org/facts/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
155. Guidelines for Online Privacy Policies, ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE,
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Ashley Craddock, Pretty Poor Privacy, WIRED, June 06, 1998, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1998/06/13256.
159. Id.
160. See generally Perine, supra note 112.
161. Id.
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Internet firms, required members to uphold certain privacy principles.162
But rather than seek to include a broad array of companies as the OPA
had done, the NAI focused exclusively on the network advertising industry.163
The NAI owes its beginnings both to the failure of the OPA and to
the controversy that erupted when a proposed merger created an unprecedented threat to online privacy. DoubleClick Inc., the nation’s leading
network advertising firm, announced plans to merge with Abacus Direct
Corporation, the owner of a database of magazine and catalog purchasing
records covering over 80 million households.164 This plan to join online
and off-line data, and link the data to specific, named individuals,165 provoked protest166 as well as investigations by the FTC and the Michigan
attorney general’s office.167 Shortly thereafter, the Network Advertising
Initiative came into existence and announced a set of “Self-Regulatory
Principles for Online Preference Marketing By Network Advertisers.”168
As might be expected, the 2000 NAI principles focused on the merger of non-personally identifiable information (Non-PII), such as the
clickstream data that network advertisers like Doubleclick collect, and
personally identifiable information (PII), such as the off-line purchasing
data that Abacus Direct had collected. The principles drew a line between clickstream data collected prior to the publication of the principles
and data collected after publication. They required network advertising
firms to get specific consent (“opt-in” consent) before combining prepublication clickstream data with PII169 but mandated only that the firms
162. See
A
Track
Record
of
Success,
NETWORK
ADVER.
INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/about/history.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (describing NAI
Principles);
see
also
Participating
Networks,
NETWORK
ADVER.
INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/participating (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (listing member firms
who agree to abide by the NAI principles).
163. See supra notes 63–79 for a description of online behavioral advertising, also called “network advertising.”
164. Press Release, DoubleClick Inc. & Abacus Direct Corp., DoubleClick, Inc. and Abacus
Direct Corporation to Merge in a $1 Billion Stock Transaction (June 14, 1999), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dvjdn.69p.b.htm; Greg Miller, DoubleClick Cancels Plan to Link Net Users’ Names, Habits, L.A. TIMES, March 3, 2000, at C1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/03/business/fi-4897.
165. Hiawatha Bray, DoubleClick Backs Off on Net Data, Bows to Protests on Use of Personal
Information,
BOS.
GLOBE,
Mar.
3,
2000,
at
C1,
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/03/business/fi-4897; Chris O’Brien, DoubleClick Looks to
Regain Surfers’ Trust, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2000, at 1D.
166. Miller, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. NETWORK ADVER. INITIATIVE, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE PREFERENCE
MARKETING BY NETWORK ADVERTISERS 1 (2000) [hereinafter NAI 2000 PRINCIPLES], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/NAI%207-10%20Final.pdf.
169. Id.
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provide users with notice and an opportunity to opt out of the combination of their post-publication clickstream data with PII.170 Effectively,
the principles allowed the merger of post-publication clickstream data
and PII unless the user took the unlikely steps of accessing a website’s
privacy policy, reading and understanding it, and affirmatively opting out
of such merger. Moreover, the principles placed no limits on secondary
use of the information so long as the individual had notice and an opportunity to opt out. This placed a large burden on the individual users to
protect their own privacy.
The principles also required NAI members to post privacy policies
giving users notice that the site would be collecting personal information
and, with respect to PII at least, explaining how the information would be
used or distributed to third parties.171 On its face, this requirement satisfied the Fair Information Practices requirements of “notice” and
“choice.”172 As the FTC’s survey demonstrated, however, users often
fail to read the full privacy policy,173 and even when they do, they frequently do not understand it.174 The reality of user behavior made the
NAI requirements ineffective for meeting Fair Information Practices requirements.
As the critics of self-regulation might have predicted,175 the NAI
faced its biggest challenges in the realms of compliance and enforcement. The 2000 principles indicated that a third party (later deemed to
be TRUSTe, the privacy seal organization)176 would enforce the principles through random audits and investigation of consumer complaints.177 The NAI further promised to sanction non-compliant mem170. Id. (phrasing this as a requirement that the members follow the Online Privacy Alliance’s
guidelines on privacy policies for PII). This opt-out feature, as well as those referred to below, may
be located in the company’s privacy policy, id. at 4, and may be accomplished through the use of an
“opt-out cookie,” id. at 7.
171. Id. at 1 (phrasing the special rules for PII as a requirement that the members follow the
Online Privacy Alliance’s guidelines on privacy policies for PII, which the NAI Principles incorporate by reference). The principles also require members to refrain from using “sensitive” PII. Id. at
3 (defining “sensitive” PII as personally identifiable information about “medical or financial data,
sexual behavior or sexual orientation, [and] social security numbers . . . .”).
172. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
173. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., supra note 131, at 4; McDonald & Cranor, supra
note 131.
174. FTC MAY 2000 REPORT, supra note 33, at 24–26. For example, many policies begin by
stating generally that the site will not disclose user information, but then, deeper in the policy, include numerous exceptions to this rule. Id. at 25. This may lead users to believe that the site is
tightly restricting access to their information, when in fact it is sharing the information with numerous other parties such as “business partners, sponsors and other third parties.” Id.
175. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
176. See Dixon, supra note 50, at 32–33 (noting NAI selecting TRUSTe as third-party enforcement organization). See generally TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
177. NAI 2000 PRINCIPLES, supra note 168, at 12.

2011]

Law and Policy of Online Privacy

463

bers by revoking their NAI membership or notifying the FTC and the
public, or both.178 As time passed, however, it became increasingly clear
that the NAI would not follow through on these commitments. By 2003,
membership in the organization had fallen from twelve companies179 to
two.180 Enforcement followed a similar trajectory. When TRUSTe initially took on the enforcer role, it reported user complaints in its online
“Watchdog Reports,” specifying the number, nature, and resolution of
complaints.181 Between 2003 and 2005, however, it ceased providing the
number and description of complaints filed, reporting only the number of
complaints that had been resolved.182 During this time, TRUSTe itself
became an associate member of the NAI for one year.183 This directly
conflicted with the NAI’s earlier statements that the enforcement entity
would be completely “independent.”184 Finally, in 2006, TRUSTe simply stopped reporting NAI complaints as a separate, identifiable category.185 Moreover, there is no evidence that TRUSTe ever conducted random audits of members as the principles required it to do.186 According
to one commentator, TRUSTe’s enforcement was “neither independent
nor transparent” and failed to serve as an effective measure of the NAI
principles’ value.187
178. Id. The document does not specify which sanctions will follow which violations. Network Advertising Initiative: Principles not Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (July 2000),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/internet/NAI_analysis.html. In addition, the principles neither
provide individuals with a mechanism to follow up their complaints nor specify a remedy for their
injuries. Id.
179. These initial members represented over 90% of industry revenue and ads served. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 10
(2000) [hereinafter FTC JULY 2000 REPORT].
180. Dixon, supra note 50, at 28–29. Compounding this problem, the NAI in 2002 created a
new “associate membership” status through which entities could join the organization without having to comply fully with the principles. Id. at 29–30. Associate members soon outnumbered full
members. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 35.
The Watchdog website is still available.
See TRUSTE,
https://www.truste.org/consumers/compliance.php#c1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (describing
Watchdog processes).
182. Dixon, supra note 50, at 34.
183. Id. at 35.
184. Id. at 30.
185. It is hard to believe that there were no NAI-related complaints during this period, when
there had been some for every month except one during earlier periods.
186. Dixon, supra note 50, at 34.
187. Id. at 39. The FTC, too, appears to have been less than pleased. Initially, the FTC expressed some optimism about the NAI principles, commending the member companies “for the
innovative aspects of their proposal and for their willingness to adopt and follow these selfregulatory principle[s].” FTC JULY 2000 REPORT, supra note 179, at 9. Even at that point, however,
the Commission was not ready to put its trust entirely in self-regulation. It continued to maintain
that “backstop legislation addressing online profiling is still required” and to recommend that Congress pass such legislation. Id. at 10. Over time the Commission’s faith in the principles appears to
have faded considerably. On December 20, 2007, in a sign that the NAI Principles needed im-
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Acknowledging the flaws in its original effort, the NAI published
revised principles in 2008.188 While the new principles contain several
improvements,189 they appear to have taken a step backward with respect
to the most troublesome area: enforcement. Instead of designating a
third-party enforcement entity, the 2008 principles provide for the NAI
itself to police the compliance of its paying members.190 This is a clear
conflict of interest that may well bring about a repeat of the enforcement
failings of the initial effort.
The past decade of self-regulation has been discouraging. The
OPA and the first NAI effort each suffered from inadequate participation, weak enforcement, and standards that were not sufficiently protective. This experience supports the critics’ claims that self-regulatory
standards will be too lenient, that industry members will be hesitant and
ineffectual in trying to enforce these standards against one another, and
that substantial numbers of firms will fail to participate and will instead
free ride on the efforts of others.191
3. Co-Regulation: A Viable Alternative?
Self-regulation is not working to fill the market’s blind spot with
respect to online privacy.192 There are also serious questions about
whether detailed government regulation is appropriate for this fastmoving, complex part of the economy or even feasible in light of major
political obstacles.193 While the country searches for an appropriate
means of regulation, Internet firms are collecting and storing more and

provement, the Commission released a set of “Guidelines” for how to design acceptable selfregulatory principles. See FTC 2009 STAFF REPORT, supra note 49, at 1, 45–46 (describing proposal).
188. Taking the hint, the NAI in 2008 released a revised set of principles. NETWORK ADVER.
INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES: THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE’S SELF-REGULATORY
CODE OF CONDUCT 3 (2008) [hereinafter NAI 2008 PRINCIPLES], available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/networks/principles_comments.asp.
189. The NAI allowed members of the public to comment on the 2008 principles and provided
an expanded definition of “sensitive information.” See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., supra
note 131, at 2–3. The organization also promised (again) to publish its enforcement data. See The
NAI
Compliance
Program
Overview,
NETWORK
ADVER.
INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/enforcement.asp (Dec. 30, 2009) (“Beginning in 2009,
the NAI will produce an annual summary of the nature and number of consumer complaints received, the nature and number of complaints that were escalated to membership and the nature and
number of matters referred to the Board, specifying the name of companies, if any, that were sanctioned for failure to remedy compliance defects.”).
190. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., supra note 131, at 4.
191. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 94–116 and accompanying text.
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more personal information with every passing day. Another solution is
imperative.
Co-regulation is a third approach that has the potential to combine
the strengths of the first two.194 Not enough information is yet available
about how this method would fare with respect to the protection of information privacy. An examination of proponents’ claims about coregulation’s virtues and critics’ concerns about its potential weaknesses,
along with a survey of international industry codes of conduct, will begin
to fill in this gap. This section examines the most prominent real-world
experience with a co-regulatory approach to data protection: the European experiment. By analyzing the individual national laws regarding
industry codes of conduct, this discussion provides insight into how the
Europeans have implemented the co-regulation initiative and potential
guidance for the United States in implementing its own strategy.
a. What is Co-Regulation?
The key distinction between co-regulation, government regulation,
and self-regulation concerns who sets and enforces regulatory goals and
standards.195 In self-regulation, the regulated industry itself sets the
goals, develops the rules, and enforces the standards. In government
regulation, public officials handle these tasks. In co-regulation, government and private parties share responsibility.196 They may do this by
splitting the tasks up. For example, government might set the overall
goals but then allow industry to set and enforce the standards. Or, more
commonly, government and the private sector might perform one or
more of the tasks together. For example, government and an industry
trade association might negotiate the proper regulatory goals, collaborate
on the drafting of standards, and work cooperatively to enforce the standards against specific firms that violate them. Scholars refer to this type
of co-regulation as “collaborative governance”197 or “contractual regulation.”198

194. See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text.
195. See REES, supra note 17, at 9 (explaining that regulation consists of setting rules and
enforcing them and that types of regulation may be defined in terms of who performs these functions).
196. See BREDOW-INSTITUT REPORT, supra note 15, at 17 (defining “co-regulation” as systems
that “combin[e] state and non-state regulatory activities” and contrasting it with self-regulation
which operate “without any state involvement”).
197. See generally Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17.
198. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 63, 80 (2001) (using the terms “micro contracts” and “macro contracts”).
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Many administrative agencies have used co-regulation.199 For example, negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”), which many agencies have
employed, brings agency representatives and stakeholders together to
negotiate consensus-based rules.200 This is a form of co-regulation. Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Brownfields and Habitat
Conservation programs involve negotiated, site-specific compliance arrangements that fit the circumstances of particular firms or parcels of
property.201 Various other agencies draw on industry guidelines in developing safety or product standards and, if they measure up to agency
review, incorporate them into law.202 For example, the California Occupational Health and Safety Administration implemented an innovative
program in which it worked with representatives of both management
and labor to develop and enforce safety standards tailored to specific
construction sites.203 Such government–industry collaboration, whether
in the setting of goals, the formulation of standards and rules, or the enforcement of rules, is the defining feature of co-regulation.
b. Claims and Concerns
While co-regulatory initiatives can be quite diverse, the claims that
proponents make about them are often consistent. As with selfregulation, some of the claims stem from the notion that industry members have unique knowledge of their own processes and business strategies.204 Proponents believe that collaborative processes will encourage
these firms to be more forthcoming with this information than they
would be if government alone were setting the agenda.205 They argue
that this openness will yield goals that are more realistic and rules and
standards that are more cost-effective,206 workable,207 and adaptive to
199. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547
(2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role].
200. See id. at 654–55; Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of Governance, 2009 J.
DISP. RESOL. 411, 423 (2009).
201. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 199, at 657–64; Stewart, supra note 198, at 68–80.
202. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 199, at 638–40. For example, Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC authority to promulgate ratings for violent, sexual, or
other material that parents may find objectionable for their children to watch. Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) § 551(b)(1)(w)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006)). But it first offers the
broadcasting and movie industries a chance to develop “voluntary standards.” Id. § 551(e)(1)(A). If
the FCC finds these standards to be acceptable, it is to use them instead of developing its own. Id.
203. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 199, at 651–53.
204. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 97 (discussing the “assumption that industry
knows best how to abate its own environmental problems”).
205. LYLE SCRUGGS, SUSTAINING ABUNDANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 145–46 (2003); Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at
22–24.
206. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 104.
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changing business realities208 than the rules that government would
create on its own.209 Regulated businesses will also have a stronger
sense of ownership over the rules that govern them and will comply more
readily.210 This ownership will reduce the delays and administrative
costs associated with industry challenges to government regulation.211 It
will also make co-regulation more politically practicable than direct government requirements.212
For proponents, co-regulation promises important advantages that
self-regulation does not. First, government officials will push business to
prioritize public goals over their own interests, resulting in regulations
that are less one-sided than under a self-regulatory scheme. Second,
bringing government and business together in a collaborative enterprise
should lead to improved government-industry relations, turning adversaries into joint problem solvers and setting the groundwork for increased
information sharing and cooperation in the future.213 This collaboration
will lead to more creative solutions to social problems than either party
could devise alone.214 Parties that have engaged in a collaborative
process will also feel accountable to each other, adding a layer of shared
responsibility that would not exist under a pure governmental approach.215 Because of these advantages, proponents of co-regulation argue, collaborative governance will ultimately yield better social performance than direct government regulation.216 If these claims are correct,
then co-regulation may be able to address some of the shortcomings of
market regulation, self-regulation, and government regulation, making it
worth considering as a potential mechanism for protecting privacy on the
Internet.

207. See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at 26.
208. See id.; Stewart, supra note 198, at 82–83.
209. SCRUGGS, supra note 205, at 152 (Cooperative approaches can create “a regime where
flexible, cost-effective implementation of high standards can occur.”).
210. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at 22–24; see SCRUGGS, supra note
205, at 146.
211. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 104.
212. Id. at 109–10.
213. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at 22–24; see SCRUGGS, supra note
205, at 143.
214. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 17, at 22–24.
215. Id. at 22.
216. See REES, supra note 17, at 2, 224, 233 (comparing accident rates at construction sites that
regulate safety through a collaborative process and those that use a more top-down model, and finding that the former have a lower rate of accidents); SCRUGGS, supra note 205, at 153 (conducting
empirical study of environmental performance in developed nations and finding that those countries
that employ consensual, neo-corporatist regulatory methods show “systematically” better environmental performance than those that follow an interest group model).
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Yet it is also worth considering the arguments against coregulation. Critics of co-regulatory methods argue that industry will not
reveal insider knowledge to regulators but will instead use its informational upper hand to obtain weaker standards.217 Moreover, the reduction
in the public’s opportunity to participate in co-regulatory initiatives will
lead to less creativity, not more.218 Because collaborative discussions
often take place outside of the public eye, this system could also facilitate agency “capture,” whereby government begins to pursue industry’s
agenda rather than the public’s agenda.219 Furthermore, business representatives may not enforce the rules vigorously,220 and in the absence of
such enforcement, some firms may free ride on the efforts of others.221
Established firms could also have an unfair advantage in that they could
use collaborative negotiations to establish standards that discriminate
against new entrants.222 Finally, industry representatives who participate
in the co-regulatory process will be conflicted because they have a strong
incentive—and even a legal obligation to their shareholders—to put bottom-line concerns ahead of the public interest.223 Critics of co-regulation
express profound skepticism that this process, which gives industry a
greater voice in government regulation, will yield improved social outcomes.224
While the arguments of the proponents suggest that it is worth exploring co-regulatory solutions to the Internet privacy problem, the critics make it plain that it would be unwise to head down this path without
careful consideration of the possible negative consequences and of ways
to avoid them. These competing views make it important to study how
co-regulation actually works in the area of privacy protection.
IV. EUROPEAN CODES OF CONDUCT: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The E.U. member nations’ data protection codes of conduct are a
ready-made laboratory for study of the co-regulation of privacy. As explained above, pursuant to the 1995 Data Protection Directive, each of
the E.U. member nations passed a comprehensive data protection statute
217. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 105.
218. SCRUGGS, supra note 205, at 135, 139 (discussing critics’ argument that the public has
fewer opportunities to participate in co-regulation than in traditional rulemaking).
219. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 105 (describing this argument); SCRUGGS,
supra note 205, at 128 (same); REES, supra note 17, at 12, 236 (same). These critics note that the
repeated, private meetings that characterize the collaborative approach provide an ideal setting for
such a distortion of the regulatory process. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 105.
220. See generally Koops, et al., supra note 18.
221. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 17, at 103.
222. See SCRUGGS, supra note 205, at 136 (describing this argument).
223. See id.
224. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 94, at 134.
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into law.225 Article 27 of the Directive requires member nations to build
into their statutes a provision allowing industry sectors to draft a “code of
conduct” that spells out how the broad requirements of the statute will
apply to their particular industry.226 This code of conduct then becomes
the basis for a co-regulatory approach. Industry sectors submit the code
of conduct to the national Data Protection Authority (the Authority).227
The Authority evaluates it, negotiates its terms with the relevant sector,
and ultimately determines whether the code meets the requirements of
the statute.228 If the Authority approves the code, then the code becomes
the official guide to determining what industry members must do to
comply with the statute.229 Codes of conduct thus allow government and
industry to work together to develop specific standards governing how
industry must protect personal data.
This European experiment
represents co-regulation applied to the field of data protection and offers
a testing ground on which to evaluate how this approach works in the
privacy field.
Surprisingly, few American scholars or policymakers have paid attention to this initiative.230 For now, the data protection statutes themselves are the most comprehensive resource. These statutes set out the
legal framework within which government and industry negotiate the
codes of conduct. An analysis of these statutes can begin to answer at
least some of the questions about these co-regulatory instruments.
A. The 1995 Data Protection Directive
The European Commission’s 1995 Data Protection Directive requires E.U. member nations to adopt legislation governing the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information.231 According to the Directive, each member nation must establish by statute a national data protection authority;232 identify the conditions under which it is and is not appropriate to collect personal information;233 require that firms notify the
data protection authority prior to commencing data processing operations;234 prohibit (with certain exceptions) the collection and use of sensi225. See supra notes 245–72 and accompanying text.
226. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, art. 27(1).
227. Id. art. 27(2).
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. In a forthcoming article, one insightful American scholar has begun to pay attention to the
European codes of conduct and their relevance for U.S. privacy policy. See generally Ira Rubinstein, supra note 23.
231. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, art. 32(1).
232. Id. art. 28(1).
233. Id. arts. 6–7.
234. Id. art. 18(1).
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tive personal information such as race, religion, or sexual orientation;235
and require that firms notify individuals and get their informed consent
before collecting and processing their personal data.236 These requirements apply to Internet firms as well as other companies. U.S. law provides no counterpart to these ambitious, comprehensive protections.
After a member nation adopts a statute, Article 27 of the Directive
instructs member nations to work with the industry to incorporate codes
of conduct into their laws. It reads as follows:
(1) The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the
drawing up of codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper
implementation of the national provisions adopted by the Member
States pursuant to this Directive, taking account of the specific features of the various sectors.
(2) Member States shall make provision for trade associations and
other bodies representing other categories of controllers which have
drawn up draft national codes or which have the intention of amending or extending existing national codes to be able to submit them to
the opinion of the national authority.
Member States shall make provision for this authority to ascertain,
among other things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in accordance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. If it sees fit, the authority shall seek the views of data subjects
or their representatives.
(3) Draft Community codes, and amendments or extensions to existing Community codes, may be submitted to the Working Party referred to in Article 29. This Working Party shall determine, among
other things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in accordance
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. If it
sees fit, the authority shall seek the views of data subjects or their
representatives. The Commission may ensure appropriate publicity
for the codes which have been approved by the Working Party.237

This language describes how E.U. member nations are to incorporate the codes of conduct into their privacy laws. First, Article 27 explains the purpose of a code of conduct. The codes are “intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the national provisions . . . taking
account of the specific features of the various sectors.”238 In other words,
the codes for each sector are to elaborate how generic data protection
235. Id. art. 8(1)–(3).
236. Id. arts. 10, 14.
237. Id. art. 27.
238. Id. art. 27(1).
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laws should apply to the specific features of that particular sector. They
should set out a tailored set of rules that adjust the national standards to
fit the realities of each sector.239
Second, Article 27 instructs member nations and the European
Commission to “encourage” sectors to draft codes of conduct.240 This
instruction is ambiguous. What does it mean to “encourage” a sector to
draw up a code? Should a member state leave the task largely up to the
sector, perhaps with some incentives to act? Or should it actively push,
or even require, sectors to draft codes of conduct? Article 27 does not
clearly instruct member nations on this point. The resulting national
laws reflect this ambiguity.241
Third, Article 27 affirms that sectors can submit their draft code of
conduct to the national Data Protection Authority, and that the Authority
should offer its opinion as to whether the code is consistent with the underlying national data protection law.242 This provision, too, creates ambiguity. What is the legal import of the Authority’s opinion? Is it legally
binding on the Authority? Or does it merely provide guidance as to how
the Authority currently views the code, with the caveat that the Authority
may change its mind? To what extent, if any, is the opinion binding on
the courts? Are the courts required to treat compliance with the code as
compliance with the law? Need they, at a minimum, defer to the Authority’s expert assessment that the code accurately expresses the law?
These areas of ambiguity, too, find their way into the member nations’
data protection laws; some treat the codes as legally binding, while others clearly do not.
Fourth, Article 27 provides that “[i]f it sees fit, the authority shall
seek the views of data subjects or their representatives” when determining whether the code is consistent with the underlying data protection
law.243 The mixed signal of “shall, if it sees fit” encourages the Authority to meet with data subjects and their representatives but ultimately
makes this function discretionary. E.U. member nations have interpreted
the provision differently. Some require the national Authority to meet
with the industry, while others make it discretionary or avoid the topic
altogether. This variety in interpretation adds to the inconsistency of
national laws regarding codes of conduct.
239. DOUWE KORFF, EC STUDY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE:
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 185 (2002) (codes of conduct can “clarify the application
of data protection law in a particular sector . . . and [Article 27] confirms that this is seen as a possibly effective instrument in this regard.”).
240. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, art. 27(1).
241. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
242. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, art. 27(2).
243. Id.
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Finally, Article 27 clarifies that there are actually two types of
codes: national and community.244 National codes of conduct apply to a
specific industry sector in a particular E.U. member nation. The representatives of that national sector generally develop such a code and submit it to the national Data Protection Authority for review. Community
codes of conduct apply to an industry sector as it exists throughout the
entire European community. Representatives of that sector from
throughout the European Union draft the code and submit it to the Article
29 Working Party for review. The two types of codes, therefore, differ
both in their scope and in the process by which they are reviewed.
B. National Laws Governing Data Protection Codes of Conduct:
Common Elements
While the national laws that implement Article 27 diverge from
each other in important ways, they also share some important elements.
First, all the national laws contain substantive data protection requirements that apply by default to sectors that do not draft their own codes.
Thus, the sectoral codes of conduct all operate against a background of
substantive data protection law. Second, consistent with the Article 27
language, most statutes say that the purpose of a code of conduct is to
adapt the national law so that it fits the realities of the sector. For example, the Dutch data protection law states that organizations should draft
codes of conduct that implement the law in light of “the particular features of the sector or sectors of society in which these organizations are
operating . . . .”245 Other national laws are similar.246 At least one nation
goes further and defines the codes’ purpose more ambitiously. In 1999,
the Portuguese Authority passed a formal resolution in which it said that
sectoral codes of conduct should “add to the provisions of the legislation
in force by embodying legal rules specific to their particular industrial or
commercial sector” and that they should be “designed to contribute to the
stricter enforcement of the provisions of the data protection law in each
activity sector.”247 This language suggests that Portugal will look for
244. Id. art. 27(1), (3).
245. Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act] art. 25(1), Stb. 2000,
p. 302 (Neth.)
246. See, e.g., Loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement
des données à caractère personnel [Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data] art. 2(a) (Lux.) (sectors draw up codes of conduct “in order to
apply this Law correctly”).
247. PORTUGUESE DATA PROT. AUTH., ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 1999: RESUMÉ PAPER (in
English) 22 (1999) (emphasis added), quoted in DOUWE KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT
MKTG., THE PORTUGUESE DATA PROTECTION LAW: A BRIEFING ON LAW N° 67/98 OF 26 OCTOBER
1998 (LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA) § 8 (2005) [hereinafter KORFF, PORTUGUESE
DATA PROTECTION].
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codes to be more rigorous than the data protection statutes that they interpret and apply.
Third, virtually all national laws provide that, where a sector submits a code of conduct, the Authority must review it and issue an opinion
on whether it is consistent with the national data protection law. For example, the Swedish data protection law states that “The Data Protection
Board Shall . . . issue an opinion on [proposed codes of conduct,
which] . . . shall relate to the compatibility of the branch agreement with
the Personal Data Act.”248 Similarly, the Belgian law states that “the
Commission shall verify whether the drafts that are submitted to it are in
accordance with this law and with the decrees that have been taken in
implementation thereof.” 249 Other national laws contain similar language.250 These provisions make it clear that the national Authority has a
nondiscretionary obligation to review a code and to determine whether it
conforms to the national data protection law.
E.U. member nations’ statutes differ when it comes to the legal import of the Authority’s decision. Some do not explicitly assign any legal
status to the Authority’s opinion. Instead, they treat it much like agency
“guidance” in the United States—an authoritative but nonbinding state-

248. 12 § PERSONUPPGIFTSFÖRORDNING [Personal Data Ordinance] (Svensk författningssamli
ng [SFS] 1998:1191) (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/56/33/ed5aaf5
3.pdf.
249. La Loi Relative à la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel [Law of Privacy Protection in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data] of Dec. 8, 1992, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], June 26, 2003, art. 44 (Belg.).
250. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] at 904, § 38a(2) (Ger.) (“The supervisory authority shall examine
the compatibility of the submitted draft[] [codes of conduct] with the applicable law on data protection.”); Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 § 12(1), in G.U. July 29, 2003, n. 174 (It.),
available at http://www.privacy.it/privacycode-en.html (authority shall verify codes’ “compliance
with laws and regulations”); Loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la protection des personnes à l’égard du
traitement des données à caractère personnel [Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data] art. 32(3)(g) (Lux.) (authority “to receive and where
applicable . . . approve codes of conduct”); Att Dwar il-Protezzjoni u l-Privatezza tad-Data [Data
Protection Act] art. 40(g), 2001 Cap. 440. 1 (Malta) (authority should “ascertain that the provisions
of such codes are in accordance with the provisions of this Act”); Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act] art. 25(1), Stb. 2000, p. 302 (Neth.) (authority should “declare
that . . . the rules contained in the said code properly implement this Act or other legal provisions on
the processing of personal data”); Protection of Personal Data Law art. 32(3) (B.O.E. 1999, 298)
(Spain) (authority to evaluate whether or not the “code [complies] with the legal and regulatory
provisions on the subject”); DOUWE KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE FRENCH
DATA PROTECTION LAW § 7 (2005) (authority must provide opinions on drafts of “professional
codes”); DOUWE KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE IRISH DATA PROTECTION LAW:
A BRIEFING ON THE DATA PROTECTION ACTS OF 1988 AND 2003 § 8 (2005) [hereinafter KORFF,
IRISH DATA PROTECTION] (commission must evaluate whether code meets the requirements of the
act).
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ment of the Authority’s view on what the law requires.251 For example,
the Danish statute states that approved codes of conduct are only “intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the rules laid down
in this Act.”252 Other statutes implicitly suggest that the opinion is binding on the Authority itself. For instance, the Spanish data protection law
states that once the Authority has approved a code of conduct it must
“deposit[] and enter[] [the code] in the General Data Protection Register . . . .”253 The entry of the code in the Register “indicates that the Data
Protection Authority agrees that the provisions of the code do comply
with the Law and any relevant other rules; and that compliance . . . with
the code will thus ensure compliance with the Law.” 254 A few statutes
go even further and provide a mechanism by which a code of conduct
can be given the force of law, thereby becoming binding not only on the
Authority, but on the courts as well. For example, the Italian law states
that the Authority must publish an approved code of conduct in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic whereupon the Minister of Justice
may, by decree, have the code included in a special annex to the data
protection law itself.255 Where this occurs, the code “becomes part of the
legal obligations of controllers in the relevant sector . . . .”256 While
251. JERRY L. ANDERSON & DENNIS D. HIRSCH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE: PROBLEMS
(3rd ed. 2010) (defining agency guidance).
252. Act on Processing of Personal Data, May 31, 2000, LOVTIDENDE, June 2, 2000, at 2663,
ch. 19 § 74 (Den.).
253. Protection of Personal Data Law art. 32(3) (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain).
254. DOUWE KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE SPANISH DATA PROTECTION
LAW: A BRIEFING ON LOPD LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA (ORGANIC LAW 15/1999
OF 13 DECEMBER 1999), § 8 (2005). The Spanish law goes on to say that, where the authority does
not believe the code of conduct to be an accurate expression of the law, it may refuse to enter it in
the General Data Protection Register and must then “require the applicants to make the necessary
changes.” Protection of Personal Data Law art. 32(3) (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain). For other laws of
this type, see Loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement des
données à caractère personnel [Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data] art. 32(3)(g) (Lux.) (statute says that authority should “approve” codes
of conduct submitted to it); Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act] art.
25(1), (4) Stb. 2000, p. 302 (Neth.) (authority’s positive opinion “shall be deemed to be equivalent to
a decision within the meaning of the General Administrative Regulations Act”); Lei da Protecção de
Dados Pessoais [Law to Protect Personal Data], Oct. 26, 1998, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA at 5536, ch.
V, art. 32(3) (Port.) (The statute provides that the authority may “declare whether the drafts are in
accordance with the laws and regulations,” and the authority has decided to make these declarations
in the form of Resolutions which “constitute binding administrative decisions.”). Commentators say
that the use of the term “approve” goes beyond the simple offering of an “opinion” and means that
the authority will treat compliance with the code as equivalent to compliance with the law. KORFF,
PORTUGUESE DATA PROTECTION, supra note 247, § 8.
255. Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 § 12, in G.U. July 29, 2003 (It.), available at
http://www.privacy.it/privacycode-en.html.
256. DOUWE KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE ITALIAN DATA PROTECTION
LAWS § 8 (2005). At least one other nation provides a similar mechanism. KORFF, IRISH DATA
PROTECTION, supra note 250, § 8 (Irish law allows Minister of Justice to submit an approved code to
AND EXERCISES FOR SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 43
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these laws vary as to the legal import of the Authority’s opinion, they
concur in the basic idea that the Authority should review codes of conduct for compliance with the law and issue an opinion. Article 27 requires as much.
C. Classifying the National Laws
The key feature that divides the various statutes is the degree to
which they give an industry sector room to decide whether it wants to
adopt a code of conduct or, under the language of Article 27, the degree
of force with which the statutes “encourage” the sector to adopt such a
code. Other elements tend to cluster around this central feature. Accordingly, this feature can be used to organize and group the laws into three
categories: (1) industry choice, (2) balance of power, and (3) government
choice.
1. Industry Choice
The first category encompasses those laws that give the industry
sector complete discretion in deciding whether or not to draft a code of
conduct. For example, the Austrian data protection law provides that
“representations of interest established by law, other professional associations and comparable bodies may draw up codes of conduct for the private sector.”257 Other laws in this group are similar.258 The laws that fall
into this category interpret liberally Article 27’s instruction that the national laws should “encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct . . . .”259 They permit sectors to set out a code of conduct but do not

the Parliament for further approval.) “If both houses of Parliament endorse the code (by means of
resolutions to that effect), the code in question gains the force of law: the code is treated like a statutory instrument, and its provisions are treated (or rather, will have become) as if they were binding
legal provisions.” Id. Cf. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 52(3) (U.K.) (“The Commissioner shall
lay before each House of Parliament any code of practice prepared” at the behest of the Secretary of
State.).
257. BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN SCHUTZ PERSONENBEZOGENER DATEN [FEDERAL ACT
CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] No.
165/1999, § 6(4) (Austria) (emphasis added).
258. See La Loi Relative à la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel [Law of Privacy
Protection in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data] of Dec. 8, 1992, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], June 26, 2003, art. 44 (Belg.); Act on Processing of Personal Data,
May 31, 2000, LOVTIDENDE, June 2, 2000, at 2663, ch. 19 § 74 (Den.); Personuppgiftslag [Personal
Data Act] 523/1999, as amended, § 42 (data controllers “may draft sectoral codes of conduct”)
(Fin.); Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG) [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] at 904, § 38a (Ger.) (associations “may submit draft rules of conduct”); Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act] art. 25(1), Stb. 2000, p.
302 (Neth.) (organization planning to draft a code of conduct may request the authority to review it).
259. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, art. 27.
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push them to do so.260 Even so, laws of this type do not abdicate government’s role in favor of pure self-regulation. Sectors that decide not to
draft a code of conduct will still be subject to the general data protection
law and its many requirements. Moreover, where a sector in one of these
nations does choose to draft a code of conduct, the Authority reviews and
gives its “opinion” on it.
Laws that fit this category tend to have other features in common.
First, they are more likely to require (as opposed to allow) the Authority
to consult with data subjects when formulating its consistency opinion.261
Second, a law in this category may give courts the ability to review the
Authority’s consistency opinion.262 This feature allows a trade association, firm, or citizen group to legally challenge the Authority’s opinion
on whether the code meets the terms of the statute. In these two ways,
this group of statutes limits the Authority’s discretion at the same time as
it expands the industry’s role (and, to some extent, that of the public).
The statutes in this group temper the Authority’s power while emphasizing the interests of both the data controllers (the industry sector) and the
data subjects.
2. Balance of Power
Statutes in the second group put more emphasis on the national
government’s Article 27 duty to “encourage” sectors to draft codes.
260. Presumably, if the authority gives a negative opinion, this will make it incumbent on the
sector to go back and revise the code to make it compliant with the law. See, e.g., Protection of
Personal Data Law art. 32(3) (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain) (Where the authority reviews a code and
finds that it does not meet legal standards the authority “must require the applicants to make the
necessary changes.”) Thus, it is not true that any code of conduct will do. A sector’s code must
meet the government’s standards in order to be officially recognized. In short, the sector gets to
decide whether it wants to have a code of conduct. In that regard, the sector gets to take the initiative. But once it decides to do so, the national law and the authority’s consistency opinion guide the
effort.
261. For example, the Swedish data protection law states that the authority “shall, before it
issues its opinion, if appropriate ensure that the organizations that represent the person registered
[i.e. the data subjects] have been given an opportunity to express their views on the proposals for a
branch agreement.” 12 § PERSONUPPGIFTSFÖRORDNING [Personal Data Ordinance] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1998:1191) (Swed.). See also La Loi Relative à la Protection des Données à
Caractère Personnel [Law of Privacy Protection in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data] of
Dec. 8, 1992, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], June 26, 2003, art. 44
(Belg.). (the Commission “shall . . . investigate, as far as possible, the standpoints of the persons
concerned or of their representatives.”).
262. Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act] art. 25(4), Stb. 2000,
p. 302 (Neth.) (stating that the authority’s opinion should be “deemed equivalent to a decision within
the meaning of the General Administrative Regulations Act”). In practical terms, this means that it
is subject to judicial review, just as any other such decision is. DOUWE KORFF, THE FED’N OF
EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE DUTCH DATA PROTECTION LAW: A BRIEFING ON THE LAW OF 6
JULY 2000 CONTAINING RULES RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA (PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION LAW) § 7 (2005).
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These statutes require the Authority to “call on”263 or “encourage”264 sectors to draft a code of conduct, although they do not spell out the lengths
to which the Authority is to go. Laws in this category are more likely to
require the sector to consult or “cooperate” with the Authority when
drafting a code of conduct.265 They are also more likely to provide a mechanism by which the code can be elevated to the status of law and so
become binding, not just on the Authority, but on the courts as well.
Under this approach, the industry and the government share power more
equally. The Authority will strongly encourage an industry code of conduct and advocate for more rigorous standards;266 at the same time, the
Authority’s involvement gives more regulatory weight to the code of
conduct that the industry helped draft. Once the Authority has approved
the code, the industry can fully rely on it. The statutes in this group,
therefore, motivate both the government and the industry to invest in the
formulation of a code of conduct and enhance the importance of the document that results.
3. Government Choice
The statutes in the third category push sectors to develop codes.
Some of the statutes in this category stipulate that if a sector does not
draft a code, the Authority should draft a code itself and impose it on the
sector. For example, the Irish law states that if the Commissioner believes that a code of conduct would be useful and the sector fails to submit one, the Commissioner may himself draft the code after consulting
263. See, e.g., Peri Epexergadias Dedomenōn Prοdōpikon Charaktēra (Prostasia ton Atomon)
Nomo ton 2001, 138(I), § 23(b) (Cypress) (The authority shall “call on and assist professional organizations and other unions of natural or legal persons . . . in drawing up codes of conduct . . . .”);
Nomos (1997: 2472) Prοdtadia ton Atómon apó tēn Epexergadia Dedomévōv Prodōpikoń Garaktēra
[Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data] EPSĒMERIDA TĒS
KYVERNĒDEŌS [ΦΕΚ] 1997, A:50, art. 19(1)(b) (Greece) (as amended by Laws 2819/2000 and
2915/2001) (The authority “shall call on and assist trade unions and other associations of legal and
natural persons keeping personal data files in the preparation of codes of conduct . . . .”).
264. See, e.g., Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 § 12(1), in G.U. July 29, 2003,
n.174, (It.) (“The Garante shall encourage . . . the drawing up of codes of conduct and professional
practice for specific sectors . . . .”); Att Dwar il-Protezzjoni u l-Privatezza tad-Data [Data Protection
Act] art. 40(g), 2001 Cap. 440. 1 (Malta) (The Commissioner shall “encourage the drawing up of
suitable codes of conduct by the various sectors . . . .”); Lei da Protecção de Dados Pessoais [Law to
Protect Personal Data], Oct. 26, 1998, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA at 5536, ch. V, art. 32 (Port.) (The
authority “shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct.”).
265. For example, the Italian statute states that the authority must “contribute” to the formulation of the code. D. Lgs. 196/2003 § 12(1) (It.) (“The Garante shall encourage . . . the drawing up of
codes of conduct and professional practice for specific sectors . . . .”).
266. Indeed, in a resolution interpreting one of the laws in this category, the Portuguese authority stated that the purpose of a sectoral code of conduct is not just to ensure compliance with the law,
but to “add” to existing legal requirements and make enforcement “stricter.” KORFF, PORTUGUESE
DATA PROTECTION, supra note 247, § 8.
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with relevant trade associations and interested parties.267 The United
Kingdom provides for a similar process in its data protection law.268
This approach goes beyond mere encouragement and threatens a prescribed code of conduct to force sectors to develop their own rules.269
Still, a sector retains the option of not producing a code and allowing the
Authority to do it.
At least one nation removes all discretion, actually requiring sectors
to develop codes. The Romanian law states that “professional associations have the obligation to elaborate and submit for approval, to the supervisory authority, codes of conduct . . . .”270 It further provides that the
Authority is to “approv[e]” the code, not just issue an “opinion” on it.271
This obligation increases the legal force of the Authority’s assessment
and appears to make it, at a minimum, binding on the Authority itself.
Interestingly, the Romanian law departs from the usual statement that the
codes’ purpose is to tailor the law to the realities of a given sector. Instead, it states that the purpose is to “protect the rights of persons” whose
data is being processed.272 Altogether, it is a more forceful provision that
seems to have the rights of data subjects, rather than the convenience of
industry, at its core. The Romanian statute emphasizes the power of the
Authority to require the industry sector to draft a code and to approve the
code. It is possible that Romania’s historical grounding in Communist
dictatorship increases its desire to protect personal privacy and causes
people to look to a strong data protection authority in order to achieve
this end. In any event, the codes take on even greater regulatory significance under this system.
It is not yet certain which legal framework will prove most effective. The first gives the industry more discretion and downplays the legal significance of any code that it chooses to develop. The second puts
more pressure on both the industry and agency to negotiate a code and
enhances the importance of the document that results. The third requires
267. KORFF, IRISH DATA PROTECTION, supra note 250, § 8 (explaining this feature of the Irish
data protection law).
268. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 51(3) (U.K.) (authorizing Commissioner “after such
consultation with trade associations, data subjects or persons representing data subjects as appears to
him to be appropriate” to “prepare and disseminate . . . codes of practice for guidance as to good
practice”).
269. One commentator has referred to it as the “stick behind the door” strategy. DOUWE
KORFF, FED’N OF EUROPEAN DIRECT MKTG., THE UNITED KINGDOM DATA PROTECTION LAW: A
BRIEFING ON THE DATA PROTECTION ACT OF 1998 AND ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS (DATA AND
PRIVACY) REGULATION 1999 § 8 (2005).
270. Lege nr. 677 din 21 Noiembrie 2001 Pentru Protecţia Persoanelor cu Privire la Prelucrarea
Datelor cu Caracter Personal şi Libera Circulaţie a Acestor Date, M.Of. 790/2001, art. 28(1) (Rom.).
271. Id.
272. Id.
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the industry to draft a code and then gives the document even stronger
legal force. Determining which legal framework results in the most
nuanced, creative, and effective codes will require in-depth comparative
study of the different legal approaches and the codes that emerge from
them. It will necessitate analysis of policy documents by which national
data protection authorities implement their approaches to codes of conduct. Even more importantly, it will require in-depth study of the codes
themselves, the processes by which the industry sectors and the data protection authorities negotiate them, and the success of these codes in protecting personal information. Future research on these areas is imperative if the European Union’s privacy regulation is to provide guidance
for U.S. consideration of co-regulatory strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
As Internet businesses ramp up their collection and use of personal
information, the regulation of online privacy in the United States remains
stuck in neutral. Industry self-regulation, the dominant approach, is not
working. While some call for legislation to address the issue, it is unclear whether online privacy is an area that lends itself to a legislative
solution. In the meantime, with each passing day, websites, network advertisers, ISPs, and others collect and store more and more personal information. For all its benefits, the Internet is eroding personal privacy.
If this dynamic does not change, it could destroy user trust and threaten
the future of the Internet economy itself.
This article has considered co-regulation—a regulatory method in
which government and industry work together to define and enforce
standards—as a possible alternative. If those who endorse it are correct,
co-regulation could yield more cost-effective, flexible standards that
provide meaningful privacy protection. This approach might prove politically acceptable to all sides and could provide a means of transcending
the current policy stalemate. Yet, the critics of co-regulation raise important red flags about this alternative approach. They warn that industry–government negotiations, taking place outside of the public eye, will
yield one-sided deals that fail to protect individual privacy. They insist
that industry will use its informational advantage to water down standards and will inevitably put its own interests before that of the public.
They worry that co-regulatory arrangements will do no more than provide business with secure sanctuary in which to negotiate favorable arrangements.
This Article describes this ongoing debate, but it does not attempt
to resolve it. Further research must be done on co-regulatory initiatives in
the privacy field before it is possible to reach a conclusion. This research

480

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 34:439

should focus on the E.U. experience with data protection codes of conduct—a co-regulatory experiment that is going on right now and that will
no doubt hold important lessons. This Article has already described and
analyzed the statutory provisions through which the various E.U. nations
have implemented the co-regulatory initiative; however, this analysis of
the legal framework is but a first step in understanding the European
codes of conduct and their implications for the U.S. regulation of online
privacy. It will require further work, building on this Article, to determine whether co-regulation is an effective way to protect online privacy.

